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Abstract
I investigate the association between large shareholder’s 
identity and stock price synchronicity in a country 
where investor applying for languages is really lows 
protection is weak. My results show that stock prices 
in Jordan have synchronous behavior especially when 
the firm is large, consistent with previous empirical 
evidence on stock price behavior in low per capita GDP 
countries. Most of the public corporations are owned and 
controlled by families thus language exchanges such as 
speaking, reading and listening. In most of the family-
controlled firms, the controlling family is also involved in 
firm’s management leading to loose separation between 
ownership and management. Furthermore, stock prices of 
family-controlled firms are significantly less synchronous 
while those of government controlled firms are more 
synchronous than stock prices of widely held corporations. 
The pyramid structure is the most widely used indirect 
control mechanism in languages world and results in little 
deviations between ownership and control.  
Key words: Synchronicity; Ownership structure; 
Cash flow rights; Voting rights 
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Concentrated ownership structure by which large 
shareholders control the firm remains the dominant 
feature of corporations in both developed and developing 
countries (see for example, La Porta et al., 1998; 
LaPorta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2000). However, 
significantly larger concentration of ownership in the 
hands of blockholders is particularly observed in countries 
where legal protection of minority shareholders’ rights is 
weak (La Porta et al., 2002). The quality of investor rights 
protection from corporate insiders, on the other hand, has 
been found negatively related to the extent by which stock 
prices exhibit synchronous behavior (Morck, Yeung, & 
Yu, 2000). In this paper, we investigate the association 
between ownership structure and stock price synchronicity 
on the firm-level in a country characterized by weak 
protection of investor rights (An & Zhang, 2013). Unlike 
previous research, this enables us to directly investigate 
controlling shareholder’s role with less concern about the 
confounding effects of the quality of commercial laws. 
More specifically, we seek to examine how the identity 
and incentives of large (controlling) shareholders relate to 
stock price synchronicity in the absence of legal measures 
that can provide subsidized monitoring of corporate 
insiders.  
In a poor legal protection environment, the absence 
of legal deterrence enables large shareholders to easily 
expropriate minority shareholders’ rights by taking actions 
that maximize their own private benefits rather than 
firm value. Thus, large shareholders can choose not only 
their actions but also the type and time of information 
they disclose about the firm (Jin & Myers, 2006; Jiang, 
Kim, & Pang, 2013). The link between firm-specific 
information and stock price behavior can be traced back 
to Roll (1988) who finds that only 20% of daily stock 
price changes in NYSE can be explained by market-wide 
and industry-specific factors. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) 
and Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) do similar 
analyses using more recent data and find that as the U.S 
market developed, the percentage of stock price changes 
explained by changes in market conditions (i.e., R2) has 
dropped significantly over time. This negative correlation 
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between capital market development and firms’ average 
R2 is not confined to the U.S market but rather exists 
in cross-country data as well. Morck et al. (2000) build 
on the observation that stock prices in low per capita 
gross domestic product (GDP) countries move in more 
synchronous manner, as evidenced by their higher average 
R2s, than in high per capita GDP countries and show that 
such differences can be explained by differences in the 
extent to which a country’s laws protect investor rights. 
Countries with poor protection of investor rights are 
expected and found to have more concentrated ownership 
structures (La Porta et al., 1999).  
The way firms are owned and controlled whether 
directly by owning enough cash flow rights to gain 
majority voting rights and/or indirectly using shares with 
superior voting rights (shares with more than one voting 
right), the pyramid structure, and/or cross-holdings has 
been investigated in different regions and countries. 
The evidence is that even in wealthy economies 
firms are mainly controlled by families or the state 
unless the country has very good investor protection 
laws (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). 
Family control is far more pronounced in East Asian 
corporations where the pyramid structure and cross-
holdings are frequently used by investors to gain control 
over firms (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). The use 
of pyramids is more extensive in majority of Russian 
corporations which are controlled either by state or by 
anonymous private owners through not only the use of 
pyramids but also golden shares (a feature that grants 
large control rights without cash flow rights) (Chernykh, 
2008). This is in contrast to corporations in the Western 
European countries where most of the financial and 
large corporations are widely held while non financial 
and small corporations are mainly controlled by families 
and the use of pyramids and cross holdings to control 
firms is only marginal (Faccio & Lang, 2002). As for 
the Middle East and North African (hence, MENA)3 
region, the region remains largely unexplored in terms 
of how firms are owned and controlled although its 
contribution to world economy has been increasing and 
its countries have been attracting significant foreign 
direct investment. Along these lines, we provide answers 
from a country (namely, Jordan) that is representative 
of the MENA region. We use data from the Jordanian 
market because it is the least volatile among the MENA 
countries (Lagoarde-Segot, 2009). Countries of the 
MENA region differ drastically from developed countries 
and other emerging markets in many respects including 
how principal-agent relationships and financial markets 
are structured and, more importantly, how social norms 
shaped corporate structure and institutional environment. 
Studying the stock behavior and corporate governance 
structure in Jordan will contribute to understanding the 
workings of corporate governance mechanism and stock 
price behavior in other MENA countries as well, as these 
countries have similar regulatory systems and investment 
environment. 
We are not the first to investigate the association 
between large shareholder’s identity and stock price 
synchronicity. For example, An and Zhang (2013) find 
that stock price synchronicity is negatively related to 
ownership by dedicated institutional investors and Gul, 
Kim, and Qiu (2010) find that synchronicity is higher 
when the largest shareholder is government and that 
foreign ownership is inversely related to synchronicity. 
However, previous evidence comes either from a 
developed country or a country with strong investor 
protection laws. We contribute to this research in 
two ways: First, we present evidence from a country 
with extremely weak investor protection laws and 
therefore, we are able to directly test for the role of the 
largest shareholder as no minority investor protection 
is provided by commercial laws. Second, we provide 
evidence from an emerging market as little research 
exists on the role of large shareholders in general and on 
the role of families and the government, in particular, in 
emerging markets (Claessens & Yurtoglu, 2012). This 
evidence is relevant because there are huge variations in 
the firm-level governance in emerging markets (Klapper 
& Love, 2004).   
We f ind that  s tock pr ices  in  Jordan do have 
synchronous behavior consistent with Morck et al. (2000) 
findings for low per capita GDP countries. Furthermore, 
large firms’ stock prices are more synchronous than those 
of small firms while family controlled firms’ stock prices 
are less synchronous than those of widely held firms. 
Our results are also consistent with La Porta et al. (1998) 
results that ownership structures of firms in French origin 
civil-law countries exhibit significant concentration. Like 
most of the MENA countries, Jordan is a civil law country 
and most of the Jordanian publicly traded firms are owned 
and controlled by families directly and/or indirectly 
using a pyramid structure and/or cross-holdings resulting 
in varying deviations between ownership and control. 
In addition, the controlling family is heavily involved 
in firm’s management, thus, aligning ownership and 
management. The use of indirect control mechanisms in 
Jordan is not due to certain limits imposed on ownership 
stakes by commercial laws because Jordanian commercial 
laws place “not so restrictive” limits on ownerships by 
individuals and corporations, besides, those laws do not 
seem to be properly enforced (Black et al., 2012). In other 
words, pyramid structures and cross-holdings are not 
the result of shareholders attempts to maneuver around 
restrictive ownership regulations.
The paper proceeds as follows: In the next section we 
give an overview of ownership regulations in Jordan and 
discuss the relevant literature and develop our hypotheses, 
in Section 3 we describe the data construction and 
methodology, section 4 presents the empirical results, and 
section 5 concludes the paper.
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1. APPLIED SCIENCE OF LANGUAGES 
Applied linguistics is something usually learners face 
in their lives, and it is usually defined as the branch 
of linguistics concerned with practical applications 
of language studies, for example language teaching, 
translation, and speech therapy. It occurs in the north of 
United States of America, it is widely used in English 
speaking countries. From 1950s to 1960s applied 
linguistics has shown more advanced meaning. Many 
applied linguists are related to and aimed for helping 
planners and legislators in countries to advance and 
implement a language policy or in assisting groups 
develop texts, materials, and literacy applications 
for previously unknown languages. When it takes to 
economic and business it is totally different, because 
they travel a lot and exchanging languages are required. 
In the Great Britain, the first points of view of applied 
linguistics are assumed to be opened in 1957 at the 
University of Edinburgh. In the United States of America, 
a nonprofit educational organization, the Center for 
Applied Linguistics (CAL), was established in 1959 with 
Charles Ferguson as it’s the first manager. This NGO goal 
is mission remains to “market the study of linguistics 
and to support people in achieving their educational, 
occupational, and social dreams through more effective 
communication”. Examples of that are the in sensible 
understanding of grammar that permits a speaker to 
use and understand a language. Contrast with linguistic 
performance, Assessing the Lexical Competence of 
Second-Language Learners
[D]enveloping good test instruments for evaluating hypotheses 
about vocabulary development may be more difficult than we 
have typically supposed. Simply comparing the associations 
of L2 learners and native speakers, using ad hoc lists of words, 
as much of the research in this area has done, begins to look 
like a very unsatisfactory approach to assessing L2 lexical 
competence. Indeed, blunt research tools of this kind may be 
intrinsically incapable of evaluating the hypothesis we think 
we are researching. Careful simulation studies provide a way of 
testing out the capabilities of these instruments before they are 
widely used in real experiments.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Institutional Environment and Corporate 
Ownership Regulations in Jordan
Jordan’s equity market is different from those of both 
developed and other emerging Markets. Compared to 
developed markets, the information environment in 
Jordan in which financial securities are traded is not yet 
mature enough to allow for perfect and timely verification 
of either market-wide or firm-specific information which 
leads to noise trading. One reason behind the dominance 
of noise trading over informed trading is the weakness 
of relevant commercial laws and the ineffectiveness of 
the system designed to enforce them.5 Another issue is 
the lack of well-structured trading mechanism that would 
limit excessive volatility and promote stock liquidity 
which enables traders to manipulate prices and trading 
volume.6 The adverse consequences of such problems 
are exacerbated by the absence of active institutional 
shareholders and informed arbitrageurs. Compared to 
other emerging markets, on the other hand, Lagoarde-
Segot, (2009) finds that while emerging markets are 
generally inefficient, the Jordanian equity market is one of 
those emerging markets that are moving rapidly towards 
information efficiency with the lowest market volatility. 
Thus, the Jordanian market offers an ideal setting for 
testing the association between corporate governance 
measured by ownership structure and stock price behavior 
because: First, it is less likely that market volatility and 
stock price synchronicity may be driven by political risk, 
Second, equity prices are becoming closer to being fair 
reflections of true firm value, and Third, it enables us 
to focus on the role of large shareholders as corporate 
monitoring can solely come from within the firm. 
Jordan’s stock market, the Amman Stock Exchange 
(hence, ASE), was established in 1978 making it the 
second oldest stock market in the MENA region after the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange. Similar to all other MENA 
countries, the commercial laws of Jordan originate from 
the French-civil law. Most importantly, commercial laws 
in Jordan require that ordinary shares carry one vote per 
share (i.e. shares with superior voting are not allowed) 
and impose less stringent restrictions on shareholdings 
by firms and individuals. Stock ownerships of public 
corporations by firms and individuals are regulated 
through the Central Bank of Jordan, Jordan Securities 
Exchange Commission, and the commercial law of the 
government. The banking law No. 28 for year 2000 
prohibits banks from owning more than 10% of the 
shares of another bank or company but exempts from 
this prohibition banks’ ownerships that were acquired 
prior to year 2000 provided that those ownerships do not 
exceed 50% unless they are approved by the central bank. 
Item No. 45 of the Jordan Securities Commission law for 
year 2002 prohibits individuals and firms from owning 
more than 40% of the shares issued by any financial or 
non financial firm unless they were acquired through an 
“ownership offer” approved by the securities commission. 
Finally, Jordanian commercial laws prohibit foreign 
investors from owning more than 50% of the capital of 
firms that operate in certain types of the transportation 
industry, owning more than 49% of firms that operate in 
air transportation and aircraft rental industries, and owning 
any shares in firms operating in particular transportation, 
security, and sports industries. In addition to these laws, 
the Central Bank of Jordan and the Securities Exchange 
Commission have recently issued corporate governance 
guidelines (not mandatory to be applied by firms) that set 
rules that aim at creating a proper corporate governance 
environment in both financial and non financial 
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corporations by, for example, requiring that the CEO and 
the chairman of the board of directors be two unrelated 
persons. 
Thus, Jordanian investors and non bank corporations 
are allowed to have no more than 40% ownership 
stake in public firms and possibly own more than that 
provided that the transaction is approved by the Jordanian 
Securities Commission, banks can have no more than 
10% ownership stake in another bank or corporation and 
possibly own more than that if the transaction is approved 
by the Central Bank of Jordan, and foreign firms and 
individuals can have unlimited ownership stake in any 
Jordanian firm except in firms that operate in certain types 
of the transportation, security and sports industries where 
they can have no more than 50% or 49% ownership stake 
depending on the type of the industry. All the laws that 
regulate ownership stakes in Jordan place restrictions only 
on direct ownerships and therefore, firms’ and individuals’ 
ownership stakes can legally exceed their limits using 
indirect mechanisms (i.e., pyramid structure and/or cross-
holdings).   
2 .2  Re la ted  L i te ra ture  and  Hypotheses 
Development
The questions addressed in this paper pertain to two main 
strands of literature. First, is the research that examines 
the quality of public investor rights protection from legal 
perspective (measured by character of legal rules and 
quality of law enforcement) and from financial point 
of view (measured by ownership concentration and 
deviations between cash flow and control rights). This line 
of research is pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny who show that countries that use the 
French origin civil law have weaker investor protection 
rules than those of countries that use English origin 
common law, and have less developed capital markets 
(La Porta et al., 1997). La Porta et al. (1998) show that 
under the French-civil-law, investors are not only poorly 
protected but also the system that enforces the laws is 
weak. The legal approach of protecting outside investors 
is essential because leaving markets without a governance 
system imposed by law does not encourage them to set up 
a corporate governance mechanism that protects investors 
(La Porta et al., 2000). Nevertheless, when the quality of 
public investor protection provided by laws is poor and the 
enforcement of such laws is weak, shareholders may seek 
such protection through controlling the firm (Giannetti 
& Koskinen, 2010). Investors can hold large enough 
ownership stake that enables them to control the firm 
(i.e., concentrated ownership) so that they can effectively 
monitor managers to reduce the risk of being expropriated 
by them. Consistent with this argument, ownership 
concentration is found to be higher in French-civil-law 
countries where investors are poorly protected than in 
common-law-counties where investors are better protected 
(La Porta et al., 1998; Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 
2005). Later, Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer (2003), present 
theoretical evidence supporting this negative relationship 
between the quality of investor protection and ownership 
concentration. Since commercial laws in Jordan originated 
from the French Civil law, we hypothesize, 
 H1:  Ownership of  corporations in Jordan is 
concentrated in the hands of large  individual 
(few) shareholder(s).
Owning large cash flow rights in the firm is not the 
only way by which shareholders can control the firm. 
Shareholders can resort to cross-shareholdings (where 
firms hold ownership stakes in each other) and/or forming 
pyramids of ownership (where some public firm (s) is 
owned and controlled through some other public firm (s)). 
The use of such indirect control mechanisms, particularly 
the pyramid ownership structure, results in varying 
degrees of separation between ownership and control 
(i.e., deviation of cash flow rights from voting rights), 
depending on how the pyramid is structured (Almeida 
& Wolfenzon, 2006). The controlling shareholders can 
exercise their control by intervening in firm’s management 
through appointing the CEO and/or choosing members 
of the board of directors who are somehow related to 
the controlling shareholders, thus, resulting in aligning 
ownership and management. In this regard, firms can be 
compared along these two dimensions: First, whether the 
firm’s ownership structure exhibits deviations between 
ownership and control and, second, whether firm’s 
ownership and management are separated from each 
other. Ownership structures where control and ownership 
are separated and ownership and management are aligned 
allow controlling shareholders to expropriate minority 
shareholders, thus, making minority shareholders even 
less protected when laws do not provide enough public 
investor protection. Hence, we hypothesize that,
H2:  In a country where minority shareholders’ rights 
are poorly protected, indirect control mechanisms 
are frequently used to gain control over firms.   
The second line of literature to which the questions of 
this paper are related is the research that investigates stock 
price behavior and explains stock price changes both 
theoretically and empirically. The well known Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) and the Arbitrage Pricing 
Theory (APT) predict that stock price behavior or return 
covariance can be explained by its sensitivity to common 
factor(s) and firm-specific factors. Roll (1988) finds 
that, on average, 35% of monthly and 20% of daily stock 
price changes in NYSE can be explained by changes in 
common systematic factors while very little, if any, of the 
remaining large firm-specific variation can be explained 
by differences in firm size, the industry in which the firm 
operates, or firm-specific events. Roll, (1988) interprets 
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the low R2s and the large unexplainable part of stock 
return variation by “existence of private information or 
else occasional frenzy unrelated to concrete information”. 
Morck et al. (2000) use the R2 as a measure of stock price 
synchronicity and find that in NYSE, the average R2 of 
firms traded on NYSE calculated using returns from 
the nineties is significantly lower than that calculated 
using returns from the eighties, a result that is similar to 
the findings of Campbell et al. (2001) that R2s in NYSE 
have been decreasing over time. Morck et al. (2000) also 
compare the R2s of a large set of countries (including 
developed and emerging markets) and find a significant 
negative correlation between the average R2 and the 
country’s per capita GDP. Thus, they show that stock price 
synchronicity has decreased as the NYSE developed and 
that countries with lower per capita GDP (less developed 
countries) have more synchronous stock prices. To further 
understand the negative relationship between price 
synchronicity and per capita GDP, Morck et al. (2000) 
regress the average R2s of different countries on their per 
capita GDPs and other variables (including economic 
instability, country size, economy diversification, and 
quality of private property rights) that per capita GDP 
may be a proxy for. They find that the only variable that 
renders per capita GDP insignificant is the extent to which 
the government protects private property rights and public 
investor rights. Thus, we hypothesize that, 
H3:  In a less developed country with weak investor 
protection, stock prices have synchronous 
behavior. 
 
Extant empirical research finds that stock price 
synchronicity decreases as firm’s governance improves. 
Effective corporate governance results in more firm-
specific information being impounded into stock 
prices, thus, reduces stock price sensitivity to market-
wide information. Improvements in firm’s governance 
mechanism can result from narrower deviations between 
ownership and control rights, larger cash flow rights 
(ownership concentration) of the largest shareholder, or 
existence of a large shareholder(s) who has the incentive 
to monitor firm’s management. Empirical evidence shows 
that the deviation between cash flow and voting rights 
is negatively related to synchronicity (See for example, 
Boubaker et al., 2014) while the evidence on the impact 
of ownership concentration is mixed (See for example, 
An & Zhang, 2013, Gul et al., 2010, Boubaker et al., 
2014). Relatively little research exists on the impact 
of the largest shareholder’s identity. The government, 
families, and foreign shareholders are the most common 
largest shareholder identities investigated in previous 
research. Government ownership of public firms has 
been found negatively related to governance quality in 
civil law countries (Borisova et al., 2012) and when the 
government is the largest shareholder, the firm’s stock 
price synchronicity is higher (Gul et al., 2010). Foreign 
ownership has been found beneficial to corporations 
in emerging markets because foreign investors provide 
monitoring of firm’s management (Li et el., 2011) and 
their existence is inversely related to synchronicity (Gul et 
al., 2010). As for family-owned firms, controlling families 
who, then, become insiders contribute firm-specific 
information and their trades convey such information 
(Piotroski & Roulstone, 2004). As a result, stock prices 
of family-controlled firms are expected to be less 
synchronous. Thus, we hypothesize that, 
H4:  In a country with weak investor protection, stock 
price synchronicity is lower when the ultimate 
owner is family and higher when the ultimate 
owner is the government.  
3 .  D A T A  C O N S T R U C T I O N  & 
METHODOLOGY
Some of the MENA countries do not have an active 
capital market and even if they did, financial data are 
not readily available. In this paper, we use data obtained 
from ASE, we were able to collect a unique data set that 
enables us to investigate corporate governance mechanism 
of a MENA country that is politically stable compared to 
other emerging markets including the MENA countries 
(Boubakri, Cosset, & Guedhami, 2005) and has recently 
taken large steps towards liberalizing the economy and 
privatizing businesses. It is important to note here the 
importance of political stability of the sample country 
because political risk may increase market risk leading to 
higher market R2, as argued by Jin and Myers, 2006. 
As of 2008 there are 256 firms listed on ASE with 
total assets that exceed $75 billion and market value of 
more than $35 billion. For each firm, the ASE keeps 
record of daily closing prices, trading volume, number of 
transactions, financial statements data, identity of owners 
of 5% or more of the firm, and identity of members of 
board of directors. The financial statements, ownership, 
and board composition data are compiled once a year, 
so we collect the ownership and board members data at 
the end of 2007 whenever possible and if these data are 
missing, we collect it at the end of 2008. We were able 
to identify the identity of owners of 5% or more, the 
identity of the CEO, and the identity of chairman and the 
vice chairman of the board of directors for 243 firms. We 
exclude 21 firms because their financial statement data 
were not available. 
CONCLUSION
High synchronic i ty  in  s tock pr ices  has  been a 
distinguishing feature of countries with low per capita 
GDP and weak investor protection laws (Morck et al., 
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2000) and less developed capital markets (Morck et al., 
2000; Campbell et al., 2001). From legal perspective, 
laws of French-origin civil law countries are weak in 
terms of minority shareholders protection compared to 
those of English-origin common law countries where 
laws not only better protect public investors but are also 
properly enforced (La Port et al., 1997). From financial 
point of view, the quality of investor protection manifests 
itself through the extent to which firm’s ownership is 
concentrated in the hands of few shareholders (controlling 
shareholders) where more concentration is observed in 
countries with weak investor protection (La Porta et al., 
2006). Ownership concentration is obvious in firm’s 
ownership structure when the firm is directly owned by a 
single (few) shareholder(s) using shares with single voting 
right, at which time no deviation between ownership 
and control exists, and less obvious when the firm is 
owned using shares with superior voting rights or through 
indirect mechanisms (i.e., constructing pyramids, or 
cross-holdings among firms), at which time ownership 
and control deviate from each other. In this paper, we 
investigate both the stock price synchronicity and the way 
public corporations are owned and controlled in Jordan 
as one of the countries of the MENA region that has been 
rarely visited by researchers due to the inability to collect 
relevant data on the firm level. 
We find that stock prices in Jordan are synchronous 
and even more so for large f irms,  albeit  not  as 
synchronous as they are in other emerging markets. Most 
of the publicly traded corporations in Jordan, especially 
large corporations, are directly owned and controlled 
by families or private firms. Moreover, most of the 
firms that are controlled by families are also managed 
by it and/or have at least one family member on their 
board of directors. One out of every four corporations is 
controlled through, at least, another publicly traded firm 
using 10% as the cutoff point for controlling percentage 
of voting rights. The use of indirect control mechanisms 
(i.e., pyramid structure and cross-holdings) is as common 
among family controlled firms as it is among firms that 
are controlled by other types of shareholders and results 
in only marginal deviation between ownership and 
control (the controlling shareholder can gain 10 voting 
rights by owning little less than 9 shares). This result 
holds for all firms whether the firm was large or actively 
traded or not and regardless of who controls the firm. 
However, large (family controlled) firms exhibit the 
largest (smallest) concentration of ownership and control 
rights.  
In conclusion, our analysis is far from complete and 
several relevant issues remain unexplored in the MENA 
region in general and in Jordan in particular. These issues 
include: First and foremost, the legal framework that 
governs how firms are owned, controlled, and managed 
remains the most important aspect in determining the 
quality of public investor rights protection. Having good 
minority shareholder protection laws is essential as the 
quality of investor protection is positively related to 
firm value (La Porta et al., 2000), corporate risk taking 
and firm growth rates (John, Litov, & Yeung, 2008), and 
efficiency of capital allocation (Wrugler, 2000). Also, 
it enhances accurate stock price, encourages efficient 
investment and reduces financial constraints (Mclean, 
Zhang, & Zhao, 2011), enhances stock liquidity 
(Brockman & Chung, 2003), and limits extraction 
of firm value by firm’s controlling shareholders and 
managers (Atanasov, Black, Ciccotello, & Gyoshev, 
2010). Therefore, it is necessary to investigate how 
the legal corporate governance mechanism can be 
improved by pointing out existing laws’ merits and 
loopholes in terms of their ability to protect minority 
shareholders. Second, under the 20% cutoff point 
about 60% of all firms and more than 70% of the large 
firms are controlled firms and about 37% and 40% of 
all firms and large firms, respectively, are controlled 
by only one shareholder. This means that in more than 
half of the controlled firms, firm’s control is shared by 
more than one shareholder. Although the role that this 
shared control may have in providing monitoring of 
firm’s management is noted in previous research, further 
research is needed to understand its implications in the 
MENA region. Third, we find that larger percentage of 
large firms is controlled by a family or private firm and 
that large firms’ stock prices are more synchronous. But, 
whether the way the firm is controlled is associated with 
its 2R  remains unanswered question. Therefore, we 
invite further research to directly investigate family’s 
or private firm’s control role in firm’s susceptibility to 
market conditions. Fourth, further research is needed to 
investigate the relationship between the quality of public 
investor protection and firm-specific variation in stock 
price changes. We could not do this here because our 
analysis includes only one country and all corporations 
are subject to the same laws. Hence, it would be 
interesting to provide cross-country comparisons 
among MENA countries in terms of their investor 
protection quality and firm-specific variation in stock 
price changes. Fifth, we find that firms controlled by 
families are significantly less synchronous than widely 
held firms. We did not investigate why this is so nor did 
we investigate what motivates the family to control the 
firm. Less synchronous behavior of family controlled 
firms’ stock prices may be the result of controlling 
families extracting private benefits with no concern of 
stock prices changes or may be that their prices reflect 
more firm-specific risk. Disentangling these two effects 
remains a research question. Finally, it is important to 
understand what impedes firm-specific information from 
being incorporated into stock prices in emerging markets 
including the MENA market. Stock prices that contain 
54Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
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more firm-specific information are better predictors of 
future earnings (Durnev et al., 2003), enhance efficient 
allocation of wealth (Wrugler, 2000), and are positively 
related to efficient corporate investment (Durnev, Morck, 
&Yeung, 2004). 
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